Keeping Connecticut Honest: What Type of Reform is Really Needed? by Steven P. Lanza
SUMMER 2005  THE CONNECTICUT ECONOMY 9
BY STEVEN P. LANZA
Last year I drew the connection
between clean government and a
healthy economy: states that rank
high on political corruption tend to
rank low on job growth (The
Connecticut Economy, Winter 2004).
A string of high-profile government
corruption cases stretching back to
1990 has convinced Connecticut’s
governor and legislature that now is
the time to do something about polit-
ical corruption in the state.  Their pre-
scriptions for reform differ, but in
both cases the medicine could turn
out to be a placebo.
Governor Rell proposes to tighten
restrictions on gifts, trips and honorar-
ia for public officials. Democratic leg-
islative leaders are championing the
public financing of political cam-
paigns. Both proposals are aimed at
heading off conflicts of interest that
might corrupt State governance.  But
the evidence suggests that neither
would likely make Connecticut’s polit-
ical landscape much cleaner.
THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM
Political corruption varies widely
across states, and analysts have offered
an assortment of reasons for this varia-
tion.  Some states may simply have a
history or culture of public corruption,
signaled by characteristics such as
urbanization, low church attendance
and high crime rates.  Other states may
present public officials with inordinate
temptations, in the form of inadequate
salaries, perhaps conjoined with bloat-
ed public budgets and payrolls.  Or
states may lack effective informal
mechanisms that check abuses. A
dearth of genuine party competition
for political offices or widespread apa-
thy or cynicism among the electorate
may keep voters home, in the process
limiting their ability to punish way-
ward politicians.  The lack of institu-
tions like public initiatives, referenda,
and recalls that might empower voters,
or of legal restrictions of the sort that
Connecticut is now considering, could
also breed corrupt practices.  
TESTING WAYS TO REDUCE
CORRUPTION
I tested a wide range of variables
chosen to reflect the many possible
influences on corruption, which is
measured as the number of prosecu-
tions per 100 elected officials during
the decade 1986–1995.  Few of the
variables proved statistically signifi-
cant.  The three that did, though, were
quite robust: campaign finance disclo-
sure, voter turnout, and the crime rate.
Particularly noteworthy was that all
other legal measures designed to curb
corruption—including both those
now on the agenda in Connecticut,
limits on gifts and honoraria and pub-
lic funding of campaigns—appear to
have had no meaningful influence.  
Let’s begin with the one legal
measure that stands out as significant:
the requirement that candidates dis-
close the sources of their campaign
contributions.  Apparently, if candi-
dates must make their contributors
and their contributions public, they
are less likely to accept money from
groups or individuals that would put
them, if elected, in compromising
positions or create the appearance of
impropriety.  (Data for Connecticut
may be viewed, for example, at
www.cbia.com; click on the tabs for
“Government Issues & Politics”, then
“About Your Legislator”.)  
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Global Citizenship, the Better
Government Association ranked cam-
paign-finance disclosure laws on the
books in 2001 on a 5-point scale.
States with no disclosure requirements
received a score of zero; simple, broad
requirements rated a 1 or a 2; and
detailed, itemized disclosure rules
earned scores of 3 or 4.  Though the
scale ranged from a theoretical low of 0
to 4, the actual scores fell within an
interval of 2 to 4 and averaged 3.4.  So
every state had some campaign-finance
disclosure law in 2001.  
For the other significant variables
in the model, voter turnout was meas-
ured as the average percentage of voters
who voted in the 1988, 1992 and
1996 elections, according to data from
the Federal Elections Commission.
These scores ranged from a low of 42
percent (South Carolina) to a high of
69 percent (Maine) and averaged 54
percent.  The crime rate represented an
index of the combined number of vio-
lent and property crimes per 100 resi-
dents in 1990, as reported by the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Report. This variable
averaged 5.2 but varied from a low of
2.5 (West Virginia) to a high of 8.8
(Florida).
The accompanying table shows
my regression results.  Corruption is
negatively related to the strength of a
state’s campaign finance disclosure
laws and to the level of voter turnout
in elections, but positively related to
the crime rate.  A 1-point improve-
ment in a state’s campaign finance
score cuts the corruption rate by near-
ly 1.4 points, and a ten-percentage
point increase in a state’s voter turnout
reduces corruption by almost 1.1
points.  But for every additional crime
per 100 residents, corruption rises by
more than half a point.
I also tested for possible interac-
tions between pairs of the three signif-
icant variables.  The crime rate and
campaign-finance disclosure seem to
interact in their influence on corrup-
tion, as shown by the negative and sta-
tistically significant coefficient on the
term (disclosure x crime).  The nega-
tive coefficient means that in high-
crime states, tighter disclosure laws
lower corruption by more than the
average amount.
ANALYZE THIS, IN PICTURES
The first graph shows the inverse
relationship between the corruption
rate and the stringency of a state’s cam-
paign finance disclosure laws. The
green corruption-disclosure line in that
graph shows that for states with aver-
age voter participation and crime rates,
raising the disclosure score from 2 to 3
would be expected to lower the cor-
ruption rate from about 4 to 2.7.  An
even stricter disclosure score of 4
would cut corruption in half again, to
1.3. 
But corruption is also significantly
affected by voter participation.  The
two gold lines in the graph show the
effects of higher or lower voter partici-
pation rates on corruption as disclo-
sure requirements vary but the crime
rate still remains fixed.  An increase in
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Campaign Finance Disclosure Score
Source: The Connecticut Economy based on data from Thomas Schlesinger and Kenneth J. Meier, “The Targeting of Political Corruption in the United
States,” in Arnold Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston, Political Corruption, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers), 2002, pp. 627-
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voter participation tends to lower cor-
ruption: the corruption-disclosure line
shifts to the left.  Thus, when voter
participation rises by 10 percentage
points, from 54% to 64%, corruption
falls by a point, regardless of the strin-
gency of a state’s disclosure require-
ments.  A similar decline in voter par-
ticipation raises the predicted level of
political corruption by a point: the cor-
ruption-disclosure line shifts to the
right.
Political corruption also reflects
the underlying criminal culture of a
state, as captured in its crime rate.
Compared to states with average crime
rates (the green curve, same as before,
in the second graph), states with rela-
tively high crime rates have higher lev-
els of political corruption.  As shown
by the gold lines, a crime rate 1,000
points above the average shifts the cor-
ruption-disclosure curve upward, and
conversely for a rate 1,000 points
below the average.
Note that the corruption-disclo-
sure lines in the second graph are not
parallel, as they were in the first one.
Because the crime-rate and campaign-
finance disclosure variables interact,
the high-crime curve is much steeper
than the low-crime curve. In other
words, disclosure has a bigger impact
on reducing corruption in high-crime
than in low crime states.  For example,
a one-point increase in disclosure, from
2 to 3, would lower the corruption rate
by a predicted 2.3 points in high crime
states, from 5.9 to 3.6.  By contrast,
the same one-point disclosure increase
in low-crime states would only cut cor-
ruption rates by a half-point, from 2.3
to 1.8.  In short, stricter financial dis-
closure rules can help eliminate the
inherent disadvantage that high-crime




My model explains about 45% of
the variation in political corruption
across states.  Over the 1986-1995
decade, the model’s prediction for
Connecticut is just about on target:
0.80 prosecutions per 100 elected offi-
cials, compared with the actual figure
of 1.08.  Nationwide, corruption aver-
aged 2.11 prosecutions per 100 elected
officials.  So at that time Connecticut
was about half as corrupt as the rest of
the country?  Why so?
Nutmeggers turn out to vote in
greater numbers than do their counter-
parts in other states: our turnout rate is
more than 5 percentage points higher
than the national average. According to
the model, that helps to cut more than
half a point off our predicted corrup-
tion rate.  And Connecticut earned a
perfect 4.0 in BGA’s campaign disclo-
sure index, which (compared to the
typical state) was enough to reduce our
corruption rate by an additional 0.78
points.  Though recently Connecticut
has had below-average crime rates, at
the time our crime index was higher
than elsewhere. By itself, that would
have added 0.11 points to our corrup-
tion figure, but the interaction
between crime and disclosure offset the
effect.  As my model suggests, crime
may not pay, but campaign finance
disclosure does! 
IS CONNECTICUT CROOKED?
Connecticut now ranks low on the
crime scale, still boasts a high voter
turnout rate, and still earns a top score
for campaign finance disclosure.  Why,
then, the seemingly sudden raft of
prosecutions, and convictions, of pub-
lic officials since 1990?
(continued on page 17)
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though state aid still accounts for a
much larger percentage of total rev-
enues in poorer towns than in richer
ones, the state aid share of total rev-
enues increased by an average of 32.8%
in the five richest towns, compared to
an average reduction of 2.6% in the five
poorest towns.
Regressivity of the property tax is
an old issue among public finance
economists. Theoretical arguments
and empirical studies of the matter are
mixed.  But whether low-income or
high-income households bear a dispro-
portionate burden of the tax,
Connecticut town-level data seem to
confirm that pressures generated by
the last recession and the fiscal plight
of federal and state governments have
probably made local property taxes
more regressive than before.  This,
coupled with an erosion of progressiv-
ity in the federal income tax, adds a
few more potholes to the fiscal road
ahead for lower-income households.
LOCAL BUDGETS (continued from page 8)
One possibility is that observed
corruption may be sensitive to our
choice of corruption measures.  An
increased rate of prosecutions of elect-
ed officials, for example, could actual-
ly reflect more the resources commit-
ted to investigating and prosecuting
crime than a greater predisposition
toward dishonesty among the state’s
politicos.  Indeed, the Connecticut
division of the FBI earns high marks
for the efficacy of its public corruption
program  (“Enough Scandal to Go
Around,”  The Hartford Courant,
March 20, 2005).  Yet in my tests of
the many possible influences on our
measure of corruption, variables
designed to capture prosecutorial
effort, such as employment and expen-
ditures committed to criminal justice,
did not provide any statistically mean-
ingful reasons for the variation in cor-
ruption across states.
Another possibility is that corrup-
tion may not be rising, but our sensi-
tivity to political graft may be.  No
question that recent cases have
involved high profile figures among
Connecticut’s elected officials.  And
some years have seen big spikes in con-
victions, especially 1994 and 2001.
But a close reading of the data reveals
no discernible trend over time (chart).  
So whence the sense of a rising
tide of corruption in the Nutmeg
State?  When political corruption is
headline news, it may easy to focus on
the shrill news stories about guilty ver-
dicts or pleas, instead of looking hard




Whether or not corruption is on
the rise in Connecticut, it clearly
makes good sense, for economic as
well as political reasons, to foster an
environment of honest government.
But how best to do this?
Connecticut’s campaign finance dis-
closure laws are already “perfect”—at
any rate, we don’t know from my
model whether they could be any bet-
ter.  And the crime rate tends to track
inversely with the economy, so a con-
tinuing recovery should take a further
bite out of crime.  But there is more we
could do to raise voter turnout. 
The state with the highest voter
turnout (Maine) draws voters to the
polls at a rate that exceeds
Connecticut’s by nearly 10 points.  In
other words, the Nutmeg State looks
relatively good on this dimension,
because so many other states look so
bad.  We could consider a myriad of
possibilities, including (1) allowing e-
voting, just as we now permit the e-fil-
ing of tax returns; (2) following the
lead of 23 other states that have more
than one “election day”; (3) permitting
Election Day voter registration (EDR)
rather than requiring residents to regis-
ter ahead of time (now at least 14 days
before an election in Connecticut);
and (4) adopting more flexible voting
procedures, such as mail-in ballots or
no-cause absentee voting.
The evidence from my testing sug-
gests that neither tighter restrictions
on gifts, trips and honoraria, nor pub-
lic financing of campaigns is likely to
have much impact on corruption.  But
one or more fairly simple modifica-
tions to our election system to improve
voter turnout could pay some signifi-
cant dividends.
KEEPING (continued from page 11)
POOREST TOWNS FACE A GROWING FISCAL BURDEN
Source: Connecticut Municipal Budgets, compiled by the Connecticut Policy and Economic Council, various years.
NO DISCERNIBLE TREND
IN CORRUPTION CONVICTIONS






















Source: The Connecticut Economyfrom the U.S. DoJ’s Public Integrity Section.